The emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is still an unresolved problem worldwide. In intensive care units (ICUs), first-line antibiotic therapy is highly standardized and widely empiric while treatment failure because of AMR often has severe consequences. Simultaneously, there is a limited number of reserve antibiotics, whose prices and/or side effects are substantially higher than first-line therapy. This paper explores the implications of resistanceinduced substitution effects in ICUs. The extent of such substitution effects is shown in a dynamic fixed effect regression analysis using a panel of 66 German ICUs with monthly antibiotic use and resistance data between 2001 and 2012. Our findings support the hypothesis that demand for reserve antibiotics substantially increases when resistance towards firstline agents rises. For some analyses the lagged effect of resistance is also significant, supporting the conjecture that part of the substitution effect is caused by physicians changing antibiotic choices in empiric treatment by adapting their resistance expectation to new information on resistance prevalence. The available information about resistance rates allows physicians to efficiently balance the trade-off between exacerbating resistance and ensuring treatment success. However, resistance-induced substitution effects are not free of charge. These effects should be considered an indirect burden of AMR.
INTRODUCTION
The emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is still an unresolved problem worldwide. The most visible effect of AMR, healthcare-associated infections (HAIs), is considered the most frequent adverse event in health care delivery (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2008) . HAIs caused by multidrug-resistant bacteria impose a substantial financial burden on the healthcare system through exacerbation or prolongation of illness and subsequent in-hospital treatment (Smith et al., 2005; Shorr, 2007; Kaier et al., 2008) . This direct medical and financial burden of AMR has been described in a large basket of empirical studies (Maragakis et al., 2008) . It was however recently postulated that the current state of research is incomplete and strongly underestimates the true burden of resistance (Smith and Coast, 2012; Smith and Coast, 2013) . Specifically, it was argued that 'the reason that current estimates of the cost of resistance are modest is that they are based loosely on the 'incremental' cost related to the extra treatment of resistant over susceptible primary infections' (Smith and Coast, 2012, p. 3) , and that '… antibiotic resistance has fallen victim to evidence-based policy making [because] health economists have been unable to show that antibiotic resistance costs enough to be a health priority.' (Smith and Coast, 2013, p. 1) .
A comprehensive evaluation of the burden of AMR requires an understanding of the determinants and impact of antibiotic prescription patterns as the key driver of resistance, and, consequently, also its costs (Monnet et al., 2004; Kaier et al., 2009) . Application of antibiotics incurs negative externalities by increasing AMR and thereby lowering the overall efficacy of antibiotics to combat bacterial infections (Laxminarayan and Brown, 2001) . A key aspect of this negative externality is that by inducing resistance, contemporary antibiotic use alters the likelihood of future treatment success of an agent (Phelps, 1989; Elbasha, 2003; Kaier and Frank, 2010) . If antibiotic application regimes remained unchanged this means that a rise in resistance would cause an increase in treatment failures (French, 2010) . However, as in-hospital resistance patterns change over time, rationale weighting induces decision-makers to adjust their behaviour in order to provide the best possible treatment in a changing environment of resistance. This is because of the fact that in antibiotic therapy physicians have to make decisions under uncertainty, as initial therapy is largely empiric. Owing to the fact that laboratory tests can take up to 48 h, physicians have to initially choose an agent by forming expectations about the causative pathogen and, most importantly, its antibiotic susceptibility. Wang and Lipsitch (2006) show conceptually that physicians face a dynamic trade-off in their empiric treatment decisions between maximizing treatment success by choosing the most potent antibiotic on the one hand, and the goal of preserving the efficacy of reserve agents to be able to treat severe infections in the future on the other hand. Reserve antibiotics in this context are agents which have activity against a broad range of pathogens and, most importantly, little resistance to face. The optimal choice then crucially depends on the likelihood of treatment success as determined by the prevailing resistance rates. Economically this trade-off exists mainly between the immediate cost savings of averting treatment failure and the long-term costs of a diminished pool of antibiotic efficacy available to fight or prevent infections in the future. Direct drug and administration costs are, however, also usually higher for reserve antibiotics.
We then suspect the demand for antibiotics to be responsive, i.e. elastic to underlying resistance rates of lower classes, not only in cases where susceptibility tests or treatment failure mandate a change but also in empiric therapy through adapted resistance expectations. That is, the demand for reserve antibiotics rises (falls) with an actual or expected increase (decrease) in resistance to first-line antibiotics. In the available literature, resistance-induced adjustment reactions are often postulated as having a major influence on modern health care delivery (Howard et al., 2001; Howard et al., 2003; Howard, 2004; Laxminarayan and Malani, 2007; Smith and Coast, 2012; Smith and Coast, 2013) , but rarely addressed in empirical works (Howard, 2004; Filippini and Masiero, 2012) . The implications of this substitution effect are highly relevant for the hospital and specifically the intensive care units (ICUs), where treatment failure has severe consequences, incurs large costs, and where resistance selection pressure is more intense than in outpatient settings (French, 2010) . Although some studies mention the effect as a determinant of antibiotic demand (Filippini and Masiero, 2012; DiazGranados et al., 2008; Huttner et al., 2013) there as of yet exists, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical analysis on the resistance elasticity of antibiotic demand in the hospital sector. The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate resistance elasticity as a determinant of antibiotic demand in order to improve the understanding of physician prescription behaviour in the context of antibiotic resistance. This is, in our opinion, also an important step towards a full picture of the cost of resistance.
The cost of antibiotic j, c j can now be divided into internal and external cost so that c j = p j + ex j . The internal cost p j includes all treatment-related expenditure such as the drug price and the costs of administering the drug. External costs are given by ex j . This accounts for the societal burden that each antibiotic j causes by increasing resistance and thereby lowering the overall efficacy of antibiotics (Herrmann and Gaudet, 2009 ).
1 The model can therefore be extended into:
Please note that this formulation applies only in instances of empirical antibiotic therapy where the physician does not know whether the patient is infected with a resistant strain or not. In addition to the drug-specific aspects of resistance, this formulation may be further extended with patient-specific consequences of receiving drug j. Let ε ij be a vector capturing drug interactions, side effects, convenience, and other drug characteristics that vary by patient. Total utility, V ij is then
When analysing the choice between two antibiotics, for instance, demand for drug 1 is then
F is a cumulative probability function, with F(V 2 À V 1 ) representing the probability that drug 2 is associated with a higher utility. 1 À F(V 2 À V 1 ) may then be interpreted as the fraction of prescriptions in which drug 1 is the first choice. Rewriting this and assuming that agent 1 is a reserve antibiotic, while 2 represents a first line antibiotic, gives:
This illustrates that the demand for drug 1 may be seen as a trade-off between the differential characteristics of antibiotic 1 and 2; namely the drug prices (p 1 À p 2 ), the expected costs of treatment failure (r 1 À r 2 )p f , the external effects (ex 1 À ex 2 ), and the expected number of patient-specific side effects (ε i1 À ε i2 ). The first term is assumed to be positive, as agents of lower activity are usually cheaper both in terms of direct drug prices and indirect administration costs. Being a defining feature of reserve antibiotics the difference between the resistance levels is negative. The external costs are assumed to be higher for the reserve antibiotics, as their use exacerbates resistance towards treatment options of last resort, severely affecting intensive care medicine. Therefore it is generally suggested that reserve antibiotics be used prudently so as to preserve their activity for severe cases (Wang and Lipsitch, 2006; Dellit et al., 2007) . Finally, reserve agents often cause stronger side effects than non-reserve antibiotics.
From equation 5 it can be seen that stronger agents are only used if the positive effect of a higher probability of treatment success as given by the resistance difference outweighs the negative aspects of higher internal and external costs as well as stronger side-effects. Keeping all other things equal, it can then be shown that a rise in resistance to first line agents (r 2 ) increases demand for the reserve agents, while a rise of resistance to them (r 1 ) decreases demand. Given their nature as antibiotics of last resort, however, resistance to them (r 1 ) may be of minor impact when analysing the demand for reserve antibiotics. The cost of treatment failure (p f ) enhances the benefit of switching to a reserve antibiotic, thereby positively influencing the level of demand for drug 1 at a given resistance difference.
In ICU settings, first line antibiotic therapy is highly standardized and widely empiric (Meyer et al., 2010) . On the other hand, there is a limited number of reserve antibiotics, whose prices and/or side effects are substantially higher than first-line therapy. Assuming differences in drug prices, expected external effects, and side effects as constant over time, the reduced form demand function for uses of reserve antibiotics q R over time t is shown in Formula 6 making estimation based on aggregated product-level data feasible.
In detail, r Rt is the clinically relevant resistance level of the reserve antibiotic while r Ft is a vector of the resistance levels for the most relevant first-line antibiotics and pathogens, to which the reserve antibiotic may be seen as antibiotic of last resort. u t represents the error term. The demand function for uses of reserve antibiotics q R over time t in different settings k may be specified analogously:
u kt now represents the between-entity error, while e kt represents the within-entity error.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Data
To identify the resistance-elasticity of antibiotic demand, a panel data regression analysis is conducted on data from German ICUs between 2001 and 2012. Understanding the relationship between resistance and antibiotic administration is particularly important in intensive care, where high application density and immuneweakened hosts create both high selection pressure and higher morbidity from infections (French, 2010 Resistance rates are calculated by dividing the amount of resistant isolates by the amount of all tested isolates. This measure is useful when investigating the evolution of resistance in pathogens and is important for decision-making in empiric therapy, as it gives the probability that an applied substance will work (Meyer et al., 2013) . Pooled resistance densities and resistance rates against a substance class were calculated by constructing weighted averages over the individual resistance variables. Application density (AD) is the amount of Defined Daily Doses (DDD) per 1000 patient days.
The average antibiotic application density increased from 1240 DDD per 1000 patients in 2001 to 1500 in 2012. The selection of agents used has changed markedly in that time period. Figure 1 shows the use of reserve antibiotics as a share of overall antibiotic application. It increased from 7% in 2001 to more than 22% in 2012. This increase is mostly driven by the nearly threefold increase in application of carbapenems, agents which are active against most gram-negative pathogens. Usage of linezolid and daptomycin, which are taken to treat severe infections with resistant gram-positive pathogens, has also significantly increased during the period.
2 With respect to external effects ex j and the cost of treatment failure p f , we believe it is valid to assume that the physician's expectations regarding these components do not vary by hospital units or time so that they can be seen as constant at the aggregate level. With respect to drug prices p j , this assumption might become problematic as drug prices are negotiated at the hospital level, vary over time (e.g. after patent expiration) and physicians are usually updated about prices by the hospital pharmacy. Unfortunately, we did not have access to prices at the hospital level. Empirically we can account for this via fixed-effects for each ICU; however, we abstract from this point in the theoretical model. 3 For a detailed description of SARI and the methods employed in data collection see Meyer et al. (2010) . 4 The panel is unbalanced, with only 11 participating ICUs reporting data every month, the median being 85 months (appendix table A1). Data is collected on doses of all antibiotics used, resistance rates of 13 pathogens towards relevant substances, and patient days per month. See appendix table A2 for the pathogen-resistance combinations collected.
This shift in prescription patterns, and particularly the threefold increase in the share of reserve antibiotics, warrants an analysis of whether this was justified by indication. First line drugs are generally preferable treatment choices if pathogen susceptibility is equal (Wang and Lipsitch, 2006; Dellit et al., 2007) . Assuming rational actors, this suggests that the increase in high level antibiotics use would either be caused by a change in pathogen epidemiology towards inherently more resistant types, or by an increase in resistance towards lower level agents while pathogen population is unchanged. Facing treatment failure in definitive medication or expecting it in empiric therapy, physicians might then switch to reserve agents to ensure treatment success. There is no available corresponding data that would allow inference on pathogen prevalence, but figures on pathogen susceptibility do show that resistance against many agents previously administered in severe cases has increased in the last years. In gram-negative pathogens, resistance towards third-generation cephalosporins and fluorochinolones has risen more than twofold between 2001 and 2012, rendering them increasingly ineffective for treatment. Third-generation cephalosporins and fluoroquinolones are broad spectrum antibiotics routinely used to treat severe gram-negative infections in hospitals. Together, they account for 20-25% of all agents applied in ICUs, and this share has remained fairly stable over time. Carbapenems are often the antibiotic of choice if these agents are expected or known to face resistance in treating gram-negative pathogens (Frank and Tacconelli, 2012) . The increase in the use of highly active gram-negative last resort agents like carbapenems might then be explained by physicians substituting away from less potent antibiotics like cephalosporins in empiric and definitive treatment. Figure 2 shows how the increase in resistance to cephalosporins and fluorochinolones coincides with a similar increase in carbapenem applications.
5
Similar trends can be observed for high level resistance in gram-positive pathogens and use of reserve antibiotics. Figure 3 shows the correlation of linezolid use and vancomycin resistance in enterococcus (VRE), the most prevalent form of glycopeptide resistance in intensive care. Although glycopeptides themselves may be considered a reserve antibiotic for the treatment of, among others, methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), linezolid is considered a last resort antibiotic replacing glycopeptides in some specific cases. Although glycopeptide resistance is at very low levels compared to other agents, it has increased in the last years and has become particularly critical in the form of VRE. 
Econometric approach
The preliminary evidence presented above suggests that the substantial change in prescription patterns towards more powerful agents could be a result of resistance-induced substitution effects, as hypothesized. Antibiotic administration decisions by doctors are made with respect to unit level resistance rates rather than aggregate figures, so that an aggregate perspective may yield an incomplete picture. We therefore analyse the relationship between resistance and antibiotic applications at the respective unit levels. Exemplary for the hypothesized substitution effect, Figure 4 shows the correlation between third generation cephalosporin resistance and carbapenem use for a university hospital ICU over a 24-month period. 6 The two lines show a clear, yet not perfect, positive correlation. For the econometric estimation of the effect we conduct a panel data regression analysis. To account for unobserved level differences in antibiotic prescription patterns and resistance rates, we use a fixed effect estimation to disentangle the between-unit differences from dynamic within effects. This differences out any unobserved time invariant factors such as ICU size, location, and general patient structure that might systematically influence the level of antibiotic use and resistance of a unit in all years. Table I gives the descriptive statistics of the main variables in a panel data context. It shows the overall mean of variables as well as between and within section variation.
7 As within-ICU substitution effects are the focus of the present work we chose an estimation using unit fixed-effects.
8
Three main regressions are conducted in which we analyse the substitution effects towards the use of reserve antibiotics. The first investigates the influence of resistance in gram-negative pathogens on the application of carbapenems. The main independent variables are the pooled resistance rates against third-generation cephalosporins, pooled resistance against second and third generation fluoroquinolones, and resistance to piperacilin/tazobactam. The second and third regressions analyse the resistance-induced substitution in grampositive antibiotics. Glycopeptide use is investigated with respect to oxacillin resistance in S. aureus (MRSA) and incidence of coagulase-negative Staphylococcus (CNS).
9 CNS are almost always resistant to all betalactamase resistant penicillins and generally require stronger agents for treatment. Finally, we regress linezolid application density on MRSA incidence and vancomycin resistance in Enterococcus (VRE).
The antibiotics on the left hand side are substitutes for the explanatory variables' substance classes in face of increasing resistance. The combinations were chosen based on a review of in-hospital antibiotic guidebooks, which list pathogen-specific first-, second-, and third-line choices for antibiotic therapy in face of increasing resistance (Frank and Tacconelli, 2012; Bundesärztekammer, 2009) . Additionally, an infectious disease physician was consulted for in-hospital expertise.
10 Inclusion of specific resistance rates on the right hand side 7 On average, variables change substantially over time in each unit, and this variation is larger than the differences of averages between units. The within unit variation gives the deviation from unit averages. Minima are therefore negative. 8 Hausman tests were performed and showed fixed effect consistency against random effects. 9 The incidence is given by the tested isolates. A crucial assumption therefore is that the number of tested isolates presents a valid figure for CNS incidence. This was confirmed by an infectious disease specialist of the SARI group. 10 Theoretically, other antibiotics would also be worth investigating with respect to a change in prescription patterns and resistance rates.
However, data availability limited the analysis to the three mentioned above. As resistance rates for lower level substances such as penicillins, or first and second generation Cephalosporins are not or only selectively collected in the data set, an analysis of the substitution effects between first and second line agents is not feasible (see appendix table A2 for the tested resistance rates). Colistin and Tigecyclin were not tested due to a lack of data variation, as these agents are so rarely used that more than 90% of observations are zero.
therefore took place according to a pre-defined set of variables of clinical relevance in line with expert opinion. The investigated antibiotics represent a large percentage of reserve antibiotics and on average 15% of all prescribed antibiotics. Analysing the resistance-induced substitution effect in the application of these high level agents can help understand the general endogeneity of resistance and antibiotic use and its implications for antibiotic demand. As the dataset contains monthly observations over a 12-year period, it is necessary to consider the time-series nature of the panel and discuss serial correlation and non-stationarity.
11 If error terms are serially correlated, then standard errors are inconsistent. Using the panel data test for serial correlation as suggested by Wooldridge (2002) and implemented by Drukker (2003) , the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the error terms could not be rejected for all three regressions. In addition, a Fisher type unit-root test for panel data, as proposed by Choi (2001) , did not find evidence of non-stationarity in the included variables.
12 There is however some evidence for dependent variable autocorrelation of first order (see appendix Table A3 ) and some 11 This is often called a time series cross-sectional dataset, as the time dimension is far more dominant than in many other microeconometric panel data. This has distinct implications for the regression analysis. See Beck and Katz (2011) for a discussion of the general property of this type of dataset. 12 However, these were aggregate figures and the Fisher type panel unit root test is a weak test that merely implies that at least one process is stationary (Appendix Table A2 ). Following Pesaran (2012) , Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were additionally conducted for each variable and panel separately. This showed that, although a unit root cannot be rejected for some individual time series, most series are stationary nonetheless. Another issue is whether or not the resistance rates can be assumed to only influence the antibiotic prescription choice in the current period t. As outlined above, part of the resistance-induced substitution is likely to be caused by a change in expectation of resistance in empiric therapy as physicians update information about prevailing resistance rates.
14 The information flow regarding resistance could be delayed, so that resistance rates might influence antibiotic application in subsequent periods. Testing the significant effect was restricted to the first two periods, so that as a general rule the effects of the explanatory resistance rates were additionally estimated using a simple finite distributed lag model for two periods. It is likely that demand for an antibiotic is not only influenced by the resistance rates to first-line level agents, but also by its own resistance as suggested in the model above. As the antibiotics investigated already are reserve agents, however, there often are no other options when own-resistance increases. Additionally, the prevalent resistance rates are comparatively low. Regressions analysing the own-resistance elasticity were performed but showed no significant effect and did not alter the main coefficients of interest. Including a contemporaneous own-resistance variable would by construction be endogenous, as antibiotic use influences resistance as well. A lagged variable of own-resistance would on the other hand introduce collinearity issues arising from the inclusion of multiple lagged variables on the right hand side. These variables are therefore not included.
The baseline AR(1) distributed lags fixed effect regression model to identify the resistance induced substitution effects is then:
Y it is the application density of the investigated antibiotic used in unit i and month t.
15 R ait is a (1 × A) vector of the pooled resistance rates or resistance densities of antibiotic class a, a ∈ {1, 2, …, A}, for unit i, i ∈ {1, 2, …, N}, at time t, t ∈ {1, 2, …, T}. The main coefficients of interest are thus the (A × 1) vectors β 1a and β 2a , which measure the induced substitution effect of resistance in antibiotic a in period t and t À 1 respectively. As discussed above, it is reasonable to assume that time invariant factors are somehow correlated with the explanatory variables. The unit fixed-effect c i is therefore estimated to remove all time invariant heterogeneity between the units. 16 Finally, u it gives the autoregressive error term while ε it is the idiosyncratic error term for unit i and time t. Table II gives regression results for carbapenem use. Resistance to third generation cephalosporin has a significant contemporaneous effect in the one way error component model. A one percentage point increase in third generation cephalosporin resistance increases carbapenem application density by 0.43%. This is a moderate effect considering the substantial increase in prevalence of cephalosporin resistance over time. There is no 13 We chose not to use a lagged dependent variable approach as this could obfuscate the investigated effect when lags of the independent variables are added. Including lagged dependent variables into a fixed effects model additionally biases coefficients (Nickell, 1981) . Although Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a widely used GMM instrumental variable estimation to solve this problem for small microeconometric datasets, there are distinct issues that arise in a large cross-sectional time series context (Judson and Owen, 1999 ). 14 Investigating the same dataset Meyer et al. (2010) note that most antibiotic administrations are likely to be empiric, as the mean ICU stay is merely 4 days. 15 These and the following notations are largely adapted from Wooldridge (2010) . 16 The fixed effects model is estimated with a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach to be able to obtain consistent R 2 in Stata. 17 The fixed effects remove the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, but do not account for unobserved time specific effects that influence all cross-sections. Events like the market entry of daptomycin in 2006 might for example systematically influence the prescription of linezolid and glycopeptides, as it presents a therapeutic substitute. To account for this and other unobservable time specific effects, like seasonality, that could systematically influence antibiotic use or resistance rates, we additionally present a two-way error component fixed effect model by calculating time fixed effect. The remaining identifying variation to explain antibiotic demand is then the differential dynamics of resistance rates across ICUs. We moreover added a third specification including a time trend. All three specifications are separately calculated with and without lagged independent variables for comparison. 
Results
Notes:
The regressions include monthly data on the application density (AD) of carbapenems (Imipenem, meropenem, ertapenem and doripenem) from 2001 to 2012. Resistance is measured as the resistance rate: resistant isolates as a proportion of all tested isolates. All included resistance rate are for gram-negative pathogens only. The 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets. ***Significant at the 1% level.
significant effect of the lagged variable. The strong aggregate correlation as depicted in Figure 2 then possibly reflects mostly between-unit differences rather than within effects. Moreover, once time fixed effects or a time trend are estimated this effect disappears, suggesting that the measured effect could for example be because of events simultaneously affecting all ICUs or an underlying trend that is independent of the hypothesized effect. Apart from third generation cephalosporins only resistance to Piperacillin/Tazobactam has a significant contemporaneous effect in the first model. No effect is found for second and third generation fluoroquinolone resistance. The picture is different for the regressions on Linezolid use as summarized in Table III . Both MRSA and VRE rates significantly influence the application density of Linezolid in all six specifications. In the one-way error component distributed lag model there is an estimated 0.72% rise in Linezolid use when MRSA rates increase by one percentage point. An analogous rise in VRE rates is associated with a 1.58% increase in linezolid application, which is a considerable effect in light of the average prevalence of VRE of around 9% in 2012. VRE in the previous period also exhibits a statistically and economically significant effect on the application density of around 1.35% per one percentage point increase. In contrast, MRSA rates do only show a small lagged effect in the model without time effects. Adding period fixed effects to the model slightly reduces the impact of MRSA while coefficients on VRE are roughly half the magnitude, suggesting that some of the effect may have been caused by unobserved time effects.
The results for glycopeptide use are given in Table IV . Both contemporaneous MRSA rates and CNS incidence have a statistically significant impact on glycopeptide use. However, only CNS has a significant lagged effect. The magnitude is similar across all specifications and varies from about 0.37% to 0.5% for the effect of a one percentage point increase in MRSA rates, and from 0.15% to 0.2% for the effect of a 1% rise in CNS incidences, while the lagged effect for CNS is around 0.1%. It is noteworthy that, in contrast to the other regressions, including period fixed effects or a trend variable does not alter results relevantly, suggesting that the estimates do in fact exclusively reflect dynamic within-unit effects of the relation between resistance and antibiotic use irrespective of time effects.
Robustness of results
A critical issue with the dataset is that the variables for linezolid and glycopeptide use present a corner solution outcome.
18 Being reserve agents, many of the observed unit-month observations pile up at zero. 19 This can be addressed by a Tobit regression model to account for the non-continuous nature of the dependent variable. 20 In addition to the linear regression analysis with fixed effect discussed above, we therefore applied two further methods for the regressions on linezolid and glycopeptide use. An unconditional Tobit model with unit dummy variables is generally considered to be biassed. However, Greene (2004) shows this bias to be negligible in larger panels even at a degree of censoring around 50%. Consisting of 66 Units, the coefficients should therefore be fairly accurately estimated. Additionally, Honore (1992) developed a Tobit fixed effect estimation, whose implementation however is limited in the available specifications. The results for the Tobit regressions using the two approaches are provided in the appendix in Tables A5 and A6 . The specification was limited to a static model, as introducing dynamic effects further complicates consistent estimation (Honoré, 1993) . Available models for dynamic fixed effects Tobit estimations as in Honoré (1993) are not yet implemented in econometric software packages. Both estimations produced fairly similar results, and the average partial effects are almost identical to linear fixed effects estimations in a static specification and only marginally differ from the results presented here. Only for the effect of VRE on Linezolid use does the Tobit model present a significantly larger estimate. isolates that are resistant to oxacillin. VRE rates gives the proportion of tested Enterococcus isolates that are resistant to vancomycin. Resistance is measured as the resistance rate: resistant isolates as a proportion of all tested isolates. The 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets. ***Significant at the 1% level. aureus isolates that are resistant to oxacillin. CNS is the incidence of coagulase-negative staphylococcus as measure in tested isolates. 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets. ***Significant at the 1% level.
Another potential issue underlying the regressions specification above concerns the resistance measurement. In the context of the presented model of resistance-induced antibiotic substitution it is argued that in empiric therapy a physician chooses an antibiotic with respect to the probability of treatment success among other things. This was assumed to be accurately represented by the resistance rate variable, which gives the number of resistant isolates to all tested isolates. It therefore indicates the probability of encountering resistance when targeting a pathogen with a specific substance. However, it can be argued that, rather than the actual likelihood of resistance, it is the awareness of resistance cases that influences the physician's drug choice in empiric therapy. To make a rational choice based on the probability of resistance the physician would require up-to-date information on prevailing resistance rates. This assumption may be too strong. Instead, antibiotic choice could be influenced by the physician's awareness of resistance cases in his unit. Resistance density, which gives the resistant isolates per 1000 patient days, would then be a more appropriate measurement. 21 To test the results above for robustness we additionally conducted the regressions using resistance density variables instead of resistance rates. The results are given in tables A7-A19 in the appendix.
The results for Carbapenem use differ in that fluoroquinolone resistance can now be shown to significantly influence application of carbapenems in all specifications when using resistance density measures. The effect is, however, fairly small at less than 0.1% increase in application for a 1% increase in resistance density. Lagged MRSA rates can moreover be shown to significantly influence linezolid and glycopeptide application, while other variables are similar with respect to significance and direction of the effect. 22 It is not evident where this difference stems from, but potentially for fluorochinolone resistance and MRSA it is less the resistance rate than the prevalence of cases that influences antibiotic treatment decisions. This certainly makes sense for MRSA, as it is the most prevalent and known resistant pathogen in the intensive care setting, so that physician may be more sensitive to an increase in these cases.
A potential caveat in all regressions is cross-resistance, which can cause collinearity in the explanatory variables. If resistance towards one substance class is accompanied by resistance to another, it is hard to disentangle the two effects in a regression. This could possibly explain why, in contrast to the preliminary conjecture, fluoroquinolone resistance rates cannot be shown to influence carbapenem consumption when cephalosporin and piperacillin/tazobactam resistance is accounted for. The exclusion of third generation cephalosporin and piperacillin/tazobactam resistance in the regression of Table II , for instance, leads to a significant point estimate of second and third generation fluoroquinolone resistance. A one percentage point increase in resistance is then accompanied by an approximate 0.38% (p < 0.01) increase in carbapenem use in the oneway error component model (Appendix Table A10 ).
A crucial assumption concerning the nature of the panel data is that its unbalancedness is not because of systematic reasons. Data gaps may bias the results, if their occurrence is correlated to the idiosyncratic error terms. Likewise, if time series are later added or retracted selectively for time varying characteristics, outcomes are biassed in a similar manner. Moreover, the unbalanced nature of the data could pose a problem if the process of reporting data itself influences prescription behaviour in the respective unit. In the last decades, for instance, it has been shown that the existence of a surveillance system itself prevents nosocomial infections (Haley et al., 1985; Pittet et al., 2005; Gastmeier et al., 2006; Pittet et al., 2005) . If SARI participation leads to increased efforts to record and report resistance rates within the ICU, then the resistance-responsive antibiotic prescription patterns may be systematically different for units that have been part of the panel for a longer time than for newly added ones. Self-selection can also prevent causal inference if ICUs decide to participate in the programme or leave it for reasons correlated with the time varying unobserved effect. The researchers collecting the data have, however, confirmed that to the best of their knowledge there are no systematic patterns that cause the unbalancedness, but rather that administrative issues are at the root.
DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
The results of the three core regressions support in general our hypothesis that demand for reserve antibiotics significantly increases when lower level resistance rises. This necessarily gives an incomplete picture of the total demand for antibiotics, as other factors such as the disease itself, epidemiological and pharmacological aspects, and antibiotic prices were not taken into account. However, as the analysis was restricted to ICUs, it is likely that, compared to other in-and outpatient settings, treatment success, as given by the susceptibility of pathogens to a substance, plays the most important role in demand for antibiotics. At least this holds if ICUs are set up similar to the German system.
For some models the lagged effect of resistance was also shown to be significant. This supports the conjecture that part of the substitution effect is caused by physicians changing antibiotic choices in empiric treatment by adapting their resistance expectation to new information on resistance prevalence. It is plausible that this transmission is not instantaneous. 23 In this respect demand responsiveness to MRSA may be systematically different to other pathogens as rapid testing is increasingly used to immediately screen patients for MRSA, so that definitive therapy is often possible within a short time period (Harbarth et al., 2006) . This may explain why, in contrast to other resistance rates, there was no lagged effect of MRSA in most specifications.
Up until now, the resistance elasticity of empiric antibiotic therapy has gained little attention in the context of antibiotic resistance and stewardship. For policy makers, an important implication of this is that the availability and accuracy of information about prevalence of pathogens and resistance rates can increase treatment optimality by allowing physicians to efficiently balance the trade-off of resistance and treatment success (Kollef, 2000) . This may be reflected in the increase in surveillance efforts across the world.
24 Improving diagnostic methods in terms of accuracy and speed can also increase treatment efficiency by allowing prompt, definitive treatment based on pathogen and susceptibility information (Klein et al., 2007) .
Economically, the analysis suggests that resistance can increase costs by causing a substitution towards stronger agents, which are often more expensive in direct terms. This effect was analysed by Howard (2004) for the outpatient sector. In intensive care settings, indirect costs of stronger medication, such as more expensive administration procedures and additional necessary care, are likely to play the leading part.
For future research there are three main implications. First, it would be fruitful to further investigate how physicians form their expectations in empiric therapy and in particular how improved resistance surveillance and information availability can influence treatment choices in empiric therapy. While the dynamic panel data analysis allowed for some useful insights, an experiment randomizing improved resistance information or rapid test availability could help disentangle empiric and definitive therapy as the cause for the resistance elasticity more precisely. Second, the costs of the substitution effect such as expensive administrative procedures and drug costs should be incorporated in studies on the burden of resistance. Finally, when elaborating optimal antibiotic treatment paths it is important to take the external costs of reduced antimicrobial susceptibility in the future into account, as substituting to a stronger agent increases current treatment success rates to the detriment of increased treatment failures, and therefore costs, in the future. This would be an important step towards a full picture of the costs of antibiotic resistance and highly relevant for policymakers, as these external costs are likely to be substantial.
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